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NOTES
FREE SPEECH AND FREE CHOICE IN REPRESENTATION
ELECTIONS: EFFECT OF TAFT-HARTLEY ACT
SECTION 8(c)":
Demarcation between allowable free speech by employers and illegitimate
coercion of employees has traditionally been founded on the relation betveen
speaker and audience. Whether or not an employer's expression of anti-union
views may interfere with the free choice of bargaining representatives' has
depended upon a congeries of such related factors as the economic and politi-
cal strength of the employer,2 the extent of employee dependence upon him for
* General Shoe Corporation, 77 N.L.R.B. No. 13 (April 16, 1943).
1. Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 STT. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C.
§ 157 (1946) established employees' right of self-organization and of collective bargaining.
49 STAT. 452 (1935) § 8(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(1) (1946) made it an unfair labor practice
for an employer to "interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 7."
2. The Board has stated its viewpoint as follows: "As the natural result of the em-
ployer's economic power, employees are alertly responsive to the slightest suggestion of the
employer. Activities innocuous and without significance, as between two individuals eco-
nomically independent of each other or of equal economic strength, assume enormous sig-
nificance and heighten to proportions of coercion when engaged in by the employer in his
relationship with his employees." 3 NLRB AN. RE. 125 (1933). Especially in the early
years of the Wagner Act the employer's economic power was often reason for the NLRB
to insist that he remain aloof from matters of employee self-organization, on the ground
that his arguments against the union would be coercive per se. See Air Associates, Inc., 20
N.L.R.B. 356, 361-2 (1940), vwdificd and enforcement granted, 121 F2d 56 (2d Cir.
1941) ; Protective Motors Service Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 639, 647 (1936) ; Pennsylvania Grey-
hound Lines, Inc., 1 N.L.R.B. 1, 22-3 (1935) enforcement iss part granted, 91 F.2d 178 (3rd
Cir. 1937), rev'd and fidl cnforccement granted, 303 U.S. 261 (1938) ; accord, International
Ass'n of Machinists v. National Labor Relations Board, 311 U.S. 72 (1940) ("Slight sug-
gestions as to the employer's choice between unions may have telling effect among men
who know the consequences of incurring that employer's strong displeasure.") ; National
Labor Relations Board v. V. A. Jones Foundry & Machine Co., 123 F.2d 552 (7th Cir.
1941) ; National Labor Relations Board v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1941).
There appears to be no case, however, wherein the finding of unfair labor practices
was based on mere expression of opinion apart from other coercive circumstances. Conse-
quently the courts were never faced with the question of the constitutionality of such a hold-
mng. The issue was clarified when the Supreme Court finally declared that strict neutrality
iwas not demanded of the employer. National Labor Relations Board v. Virginia Electric
& Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941). The employer's economic position, however, remained
an important yardstick for measuring the compulsion upon the listeners to heed his adjura-
tions. See, e.g., Thompson Products, Inc., 60 N.L.R.B. 1381, 1326 (1945).
The political power of the employer has similarly been pertinent in evaluating the ef-
fectiveness of his anti-union actions. Republic Steel Corporation, 9 N.LR.B. 219 (193S),
modified and enforcement granted, 107 F.2d 472 (3rd Cir. 1939), decree corstrucd, 114
F.2d 820 (3rd Cir. 1940), modificd and remanded, 311 U.S. 7 (1940) ; Remington Rand,
Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 626 (1937), modified and enforcement grastcd, 94 F2d .62 (2d Cir.
1938), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 576 (1938); Alabama Mills, Inc., 2 N.L.R1B. 20 (1936),
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a livelihood,3 sophistication of the worker audience,4 the history of labor rela-
tions in the locality and in the plant,5 and other circumstances immediately
modified and enforcement granted, (5th Cir. 1938) ; Somerville Manufacturing Company,
1 N.L.R.B. 864 (1936), enforcement denied, 98 F.2d 615 (3rd Cir. 1938), rev'd, 306 U. S.
601 (1939).
An ample collection of cases wherein the decision as to the legality of employer con-
duct turns upon economic and political factors may be found in the Board's Annual Re-
ports. 1 NLRB ANN. REP,. 73 (1936); 2 NLRB ANN. REP. 65 (1937); 3 NLRB ANN.
REP. 59-62 (1938) ; 4 NLRB ANN. REP. 57-60 (1939); 5 NLRB ANN. REP. 32-7 (1940);
6 NLRB ANN. REP. 41-4 (1941) ; 7 NLRB ANN. REP. 42-5 (1942) ; 8 NLRB ANN. Rm'.
27-30 (1943); 9 NLRB ANN. REP. 36-9 (1944); 10 NLRB ANN. Rap. 37 (1945); 11
NLRB ANN. REP. 34-6 (1946); 12 NLRB ANN. REP. 26-7 (1947).
3. Threats to reduce employees' privileges in a company town: Good Coal Company,
,12 N.L.R.B. 136 (1939), enforcement granted, 110 F.2d 501 (6th Cir. 1940), cert. denied,
310 U. S. 630 (1940) ; Carlisle Lumber Company, 2 N.L.R.B. 248 (1936), modified and
enforcement granted, 94 F.2d 138 (9th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 304 U. S. 575 (1938).
Threats to move a plant or to shut down altogether if the union wins: The Pickwlck
- Company, 69 N.L.R.B. 314 (1946) ; A. J. Showalter Company, 64 N.L.R.B. 573 (1945).
Authorities are collected in 1 NLRB AN. REP. 73 (1936); 2 NLRB ANN. Rap. 64-5
(1937).
4. North Carolina Finishing Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 133 F.2d 714
(4th Cir. 1943) (union "a bunch of Germans . . . to hamper defense work") ; R. R. Don-
nelley and Sons Company, 60 N.L.R.B. 635 (1945) (employer implied that there was some-
thing unpatriotic and subversive in self-organization during the war emergency) ; Auburn
Foundry, Inc., 26 N.L.R.B. 878 (1940), modified and enforcement granted, 119 F. 2d 331
(7th Cir. 1941) (CIO "a bunch of communists and thugs" who "would get your money and
wouldn't do you any good"); Arcade-Sunshine Company, Inc., 12 N.L.R.B. 259 (1939)
enforcement granted, 118 F.2d 49 (D. C. Cir. 1940), modified upon rehearing, 118 F.2d 49
(D. C. Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 313 U.,S. 567 (1941) (negro employees are told that the
AFL was unfriendly to negroes) ; Lane Cotton Mills Co., 9 N.L.R.B. 952 (1939), enforce-
ment granted, 111 F.2d 814 (5th Cir. 1940), petition for writ of cert. dinissed on mio-
tion of petitioner, 311 U.S. 723 (1940); For a full discussion of the status of employers'
untruthful or misleading statements, see Comment, Labor Law: Employers' Right of Free
Speech ulnder N.L.R.A., 34 CALIF. L. Rv. 415, 417-23 (1946). More extensive citations
may.be found in 2 TEUa, LABOR DIsPuTs AND CoLEcrva BARGAINING §286 (1940)
(Supp. 1947).
5. The Board has repeatedly proscribed otherwise lawful speech when it was an in-
tegral part of a coercive anti-union campaign, Compare National Labor Relations Board
v. Virginia Electric & Power Company, 314 U. S. 469 (1941), with Virginia Electric &
Power Company v. National Labor Relations Board, 319 11. S. 533 (1943). Anderson
Manufacturing Company, 58 N.L.R.B. 1511 (1944) (statements, lawful when made, be-
come coercive in the course of employer's subseqtient conduct); Van Raalte Company,
55 N.L.R.B. 146 (1944); Trojan Powder Company, 41 N.L.R.B. 1308 (1942), enforce-
ment granted, 135 F.2d 337 (3rd Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 768 (1943); Ford
Motor Company, 23 N.L.R.B. 342 (1940), enforced by consent, 122 F.2d 414 (8th Cir.
1941). See note 13 infra.
The context which the Board has considered in evaluating equivocal statements is not
limited to the labor record of the individual employer. E.g., Eagle & Phenix Mills, 11
N.L.R.B. 361 (1939), enforced by consent, (5th Cir. 1939) (employees were told to "look
at what had occurred in other places and Huntsville and Meritas" before voting for the
union. In light of the prevailing belief that the formation of unions at the Huntsville and
Meritas mills were the cause of their shut-downs, the employer's reference to them was held
a warning of similar retaliation).
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surrounding the speech itself.6 The Vagner Act,7 as interpreted by the courts,
originally gave the NLRB discretionary authority to measure these variables
and to judge whether the employer was within bounds.8
Board policy toward management speech in union matters evolved under two
complementary procedures: the unfair labor practice proceeding0 and the repre-
sentation case.10 In the former, employer speech was held an unfair labor
practice where it interfered with, restrained or coerced employees in the free
elective choice of representatives." The employer might, within the protection
of the First Amendment, have voiced his opinion as to the desirability of a
6. Its setting, apart from an anti-labor history, may transform speech into a pro-
scribed verbal act. See, e.g., Elastic Stop Nut Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board,
142 F2d 371, 375 (8th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 722 (1944) (employees are par-
ticularly susceptible to interference in a new plant, and the employer must remain neutral
during an organizational drive).
Associated acts may render otherwise lawful speech "interference." See note 13 infra.
Or the locus of the utterances may be the coercive element. Clark Brothers Co., 70
N.L.R.B. 802 (1946), enforcement granted, 163 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1947) (compulsory meet-
ing on company premises during working hours); Van Raalte, Inc., 69 N.L.R.B. 132-6
(1946) (same). But c.f. Merry Brothers Brick and Tile Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 136 (1947).
Contra: National Labor Relations Board v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 F2d 426 (Sth
Cir. 1946). For an excellent Note on the Clarh Brothers case see 14 U. C-r- L REv. 104
(1946).
7. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1946) (National Labor Relations
Act), as amended, 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et scq. (Supp. 1947) (Labor-
Management Relations Act).
S. The courts have uniformly maintained that freedom of speech is not violated vhen
the employer's expressions of views are judged in the light of the total record. The leading
precedent is National Labor Relations Board v. Virginia Electric & Power Company, 314
U. S. 469 (1941), where it was said: "If the Board's order here may fairly be said to be
based on the totality of the Company's activities during the period in question, we may not
consider the findings of the Board as to the coercive effect of the bulletin and the speeches
in isolation from the findings as respects the other conduct of the Company." National
Labor Relations Board v. Trojan Powder Co., 135 F.2d 337 (3rd Cir. 1943), cert. denied,
320 U.S. 763 (1943) ; National Labor Relations Board v. Federbush Co., 121 F2d 954 (2d
Cir. 1941) ("Words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition; they have only a communal
existence; and not only does the meaning of each interpenetrate the other, but all in their
aggregate take their purport from the setting in which they are used, of which the relation
between the speaker and the hearer is perhaps the most important part. What to an out-
sider vill be no more than the vigorous presentation of a conviction, to an employee may be
the manifestation of a determination which it is not safe to thwart.").
9. This proceeding arises under Section 10 of the Act, 49 STAT. 146 (1947), 29
U.S.C.A. § 160 (Supp. 1947) and is governed by 29 CoDZ FEB. Rros. §203.7-45 (Supp.
1946), as revised, 29 CODE FED. RFs. § 203.9-51 (Supp. 1947). For a descriptive analysis of
the proceeding, see RmcKxOr' AND REcroR, PRocEDTRE AND PnAcTicrs uz.Dmc Tan NA-
TioNAL LAOR RELATioNS Acr 21-48 (1940).
10. The authority to determine collective bargaining representatives vms granted to
the Board by Section 9 of the Act, 49 STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1946), as
amended, 61 STAT. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 159 (Supp. 1947). Procedure is set forth in
29 CODE FED. REws. §203.46-58 (Supp. 1946), as revised, 19 CoDz Fun. RrEos. § 203.52-64
(Supp. 1947).
11. See note 1 sup ra.
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union in his plant, but was forbidden from threatening physical or economic
reprisals or promising benefits for any action which his employees might take
with respect to the union.12 Even where employer speech did not contain open
threats, viewed in the complex of employer activities it was sometimes held to
carry expressions of implied coercion. 13 Such pre-election utterances were de-
dared unfair labor practices and subject to a cease and desist order.
In the representation cases, the Board, fashioning standards of election
integrity case by case, assumed the power to set aside a representation election
as unfair.' 4 Where unfair labor practices were not involved, the Board set
aside elections for such matters as misconduct of a Board agent,' defects in
12. Thus, the Supreme Court, in National Labor Relations Board v. Virginia Electrlc
& Power Company, 314 U.S. 469 (1941), summed up its conclusions as follows: "The etn-
ployer in this case is as free now as ever to take any side it may choose on this controver-
sial issue. But certainly, conduct, though evidenced in part by speech, may amount, in con-
nection with other circumstances, to coercion within the meaning of the Act. If the total
activities of an employer restrain or coerce his employees in their free choice, then those
employees are entitled to the protection of the Act. And in determining whether a course
of conduct amounts to restraint or coercion, pressure exerted vocally by the employer may
no more be disregarded than pressure exerted in other ways." Id. at 477. But see Na-
tional Labor Relations Board v. Stone, 125 F.2d 752, 756 (7th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317
U. S. 649 (1942). Precedents are collected in 2 TELLER, op. cit. sipra note 4, § 252, 283,
284.
It is less certain that anti-union sentiments by the employer could be expressed with
impunity during the earlier years of the Act. See note 2 supra. Until the air was cleared
by the Virginia Electric case, supra, the circuit courts appeared to disagree in respect to
the employer's right to register any opinion in union affairs. Compare National Labor
Relations Board v. Federbush Co., Inc., 121 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1941) with National Labor
Relations Board v. Ford Motor Company, 114 F.2d 905 (6th Cir. 1940). See also, Daykin,
The Employer's Right of Free Speech in Industry under the National Labor Relations
Act, 40 IL. L. REv. 185 (1945); Morgan, Employer's Freedom of Speech and the Wagner
Act, 20 TUL. L. Rav. (1946) ; Sinsheimer, Employer Free Speech-A Comparative Analy-
sis, 14 U. CHII. L. REv. 617 (1947) ; 2 TELLER, op. cit. supra note 4, § 252.
13. Lawful speech so connected with an unlawful act as to convey the impression that
the act would follow non-compliance with the employer's wishes: Jacksonville Paper Co.
v. National Labor Relations Board, 137 F.2d 148 (5th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U. S.
772 (1943) (discriminatory discharge); Indianapolis Glove Company, 5 N.L.R.B. 231
(1938) (employer sponsored company-dominated union).
Intimidatory nature of speech appears when examined as part of a coercive anti-union
campaign: National Labor Relations Board v. Trojan Powder Company, 135 F,2d 337
(3rd Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U. S.- 768 (1943) ; National Labor Relations Board v.
Stone, 125 F. 2d 752 (7th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 649 (19,12) ; Van Raalte Co.,
55 N.L.R.B. 146 (1944).
Illegal interference when speech was made to "forced" listeners on company grounds
and company time: Clark Brothers Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 802 (1946), enforcement granted, 163
F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1947). Contra: National Labor Relations Board v. Montgomery Ward
& Co., 157 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1946).
14. This power was never expressly granted by the Act. See note 10 supra. Nor do
the Congressional Reports mention Board authority to void elections. See H. R. REP'. No.
1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) ; SEN. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
15. Knox Metal Products, Inc., 75 N.L.R.B. 277 (1947) (Board agent failed to chal-
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election machinery,"0 improper behaior on the part of a participating union,1
or prejudicial acts by third parties.' s 'Where employer conduct v.as in issue
the tests paralleled those evolved for unfair labor practice proceedings. 0 The
relationship is most clearly illustrated in consolidated cases, where the unlaw-
ful conduct involved had been committed in connection with elections and
furnished the basis both for issuing a cease and desist order, and for setting
aside the election. In such cases, the Board's decision as to the election pro-
lenge ballot of a non-eligible voter) ; Walker Vehicle Co., 7 N.L.R.B. 827 (1938) (union
erroneously designated as company union in the election notice).
16. River Raisin Paper Company, 70 N.L.R.B. 1348 (1946) (before the parties had
an opportunity to file exceptions to the Regional Director's report on challenges, the chal-
lenges he recommended be overruled were opened and counted); Hunt Foods, Inc. 70
N.L.R.B. 1312 (1946) (official election notices not received from Regional Office in time to
be properly posted) ; Louis Marx Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 1242 (1946) (employees in one depart-
ment not afforded same voting opportunity as those in other departments).
The Board has consistently sustained objections to an election where the secrecy of
ballot had not been maintained. E.g., Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 4 N.L.ILB. 271
(1937).
17. Acme Brewing Co., 74 N.L.R.B. 146 (1947) (union contestant distributed a new
and more favorable contract executed by it, to become effective after the election) ; Sears
Roebuck & Company, 47 N.L.R.B. 291 (1943) (union displayed sample ballots bearing the
name of the Regional Director, thereby giving rise to the erroneous impression that the
Board was lending its support to that union) ; National Tea Company, 41 N.L.ILB. 774
(1942) (acts of violence directed against rival union). But ef. Merrimac Mills Co., 65
N.L.R.B. 308 (1946) (references to rival union as "phoney stooge outfit" and "Company
union" did not prevent employees from exercising a free choice).
18. Thus, eleventh hour announcements that the War Labor Board had approved wage
increases, which tend to influence employees to vote for a particular union credited with
securing the increase or for no union at all were held a restraint upon free choice. Seneca
Knitting Mills, Inc., 59 N.L.R.B. 754 (1944) ; Continental Oil Company, 58 N.L.R.B. 16S
(1944). But cf. Chicago Mill & Lumber Company, 64 N.L.R.B. 349 (1945). See also
P. D. Gwaltney, Jr. and Company, 74 N.L.R.B. 371 (1947) ("Citizens Committee"
threatened to lynch organizers and promised reprisal by Ku Klux Klan in the event of un-
ion victory). This case was cited by the Board as precedent for its order setting aside the
election in the General Shoe Corporation case, pp. 170-2 infra. But it is distinguishable, as
are all the decisions cited in notes 15-18 supra, in that the misconduct interfering with free
choice was not engaged in by the employer, and therefore could not be an unfair labor
practice under the Act.
19. Hercules Motor Corporation, 73 N.L.R.B. 650 (1947); Charles H. Bacon Com-
pany, 55 N.L.R.B. 1180 (1944); Tennessee Copper Company, 8 N.L.R.B. 575 (1933);
But see Howell Electric Motors Company, 62 N.L.R.B. 1337, 1344 n. 12 (1945). In addi-
tion, the Board has held that employer conduct sufficient to vitiate election results prior to
a court ruling that such conduct was not an unfair labor practice, was no longer adequate
grounds for setting aside an election. Merry Bros. Brick & Tile Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 136
(1947) ; Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 70 N.L.R.B. 1363 (1946).
The coincidence of standards in both proceedings should not be unexpected, for the
courts, in reviewing unfair practice cases, were setting constitutional bounds for free speech
which should be equally inviolate in representation cases. Consider, however, J. L
Brandeis & Sons v. National Labor Relations Board, 142 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1944), cert.
denied, 323 U.S. 751 (1944) (court reversed the Board's findings that the conduct which
vitiated the election also constituted an unfair labor practice).
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ceedings appears to have followed as a matter of course from its evaluation of
the speech as an unfair practice.20
The validity of pre-existing standards for both sanctions used by the Board
has been doubtful since the enactment of Section 8(c) of the Taft-Hartley
Act,2 ' providing that "the expressing of any views . . . shall not constitute or
be evidence of an unfair labor practice . . . if such expression contains no
threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit." This clearly restricts the
Board's use of the cease and desist order, since it now at least limits the context
of surrounding circumstances in which non-threatening arguments may be
appraised.22 In addition it might be held to limit the previous administrative
practice of setting aside an election, since the standards for so doing have
been linked traditionally to the unfair labor practice.
In a recent consolidated decision, lit the Matter of General Shoe Corpora-
20. Arkansas-Missouri Power Corporation, 68 N.L.R.B. 805 (1948); The Ebco
Manufacturing Company, 67 N.L.R.B. 210 (1946).
21. 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (Supp. 1947) ; 61 STAT. 140 (1947)
§8(c), 21 U.S.C.A. § 158(c) (Supp. 1947). The section reads in full: "The expressing of
any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed,
graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice un-
der any of the provisions of this Act, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or
force or promise of benefit." The absence of protection for oral expressions is obviously
an error in drafting carried over from the House Bill. This inadvertence was recognized
in Senate debate. 93 CONG. Rnc. 6503 (1947).
Some excellent critical analyses of the Act are already available. VAN ANKLE, Al
ANALYSIS OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATION AcT, 1947 (1947) ; Cox, Somne Aspects
of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HARV. L. REv. 1, 274 (1948); Foley,
Union Unfair Labor Practices under the Taft-Hartley Act, 33 VA. L. Rnv. 697 (1947) ;
Lockhart, The "New" National Labor Relations Act in Operation: First Eight Months,
32 MINN. L. Rxv. 663 (1948); Mulroy, The Taft-Hartley Act in Action, 15 U. CI. L.
REv. 595 (1948) ; Sutherland, Reasons in Retrospect, 33 CORN. L. Q. 1 (1947) ; Comments,
42 Iza. L. REv. 444, 458, 468, 479, 487, 492, 500 (1947) ; Notes, 96 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 85,
101 (1947). In this discussion, attention will focus on the impact of Section 8(c) upon em-
ployer speech. The problem of its possible effects on union conduct is discussed in B.N.A.,
THE NEw LABOR LAw 47 (1947); VAN Aax.LE, op. cit. supra, at 53; Foley, supra, at
704-5; Note, 42 IL. L. REv. 458, 463-7 (1947); 22 LAB. Rn. RZiw. (Analysis) 10-11
(1948); 2 P-H LAB. SErv. § 21,447 (1947). The Board has recently ruled that Section
8(c) expressly precludes a finding that pickets were engaging in intimidatory conduct un-
der the law when they "villified and verbally abused as scabs" those employees who de-
serted the striker's ranks. Sunset Line and Twine Company, 79 N.L.R.B. No. 207 (Oct.
22, 1948).
22. This limitation appears to exclude only variables in the general context of the
speech, such as the economic strength of the parties, the previous history of labor relations,
and the "atmosphere" surrounding the speech. It probably does not preclude the considera-
tion of outside circumstances referred to in the speech in order to determine the plain mean-
ing of the employer's language. See Eagle & Phenix Mills, 11 N.L.R.B. 361 (1939),
supra note 5. In precluding the use of the "expressing of any views . . ." as evidence of an
unfair labor practice or its motivation, the Section appears to restrict a use against which
there is no constitutional inhibition. This would give the speaker more protection than he
would receive if charged with a criminal offense. For a discussion of this issue, see VAN
ARKuE, op. cit. supra note 21, at 23-6.
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tion z3 the Board, while refusing to issue a cease and desist order,' 4 neverthe-
less invalidated a certification election in which the complaining union was
defeated. Findings indicated that shortly after the arrival of Boot and Shoe
Workers Union organizers in the General Shoe plant the employer embarked
upon an intensive anti-union campaign which culminated in the distribution
of a series of letters and leaflets,2a publication of a full page newspaper ad-
vertisement attempting to illustrate the worthlessness of the union, and in the
proselyting of employees in their homes by supervisors under company in-
structions to dissuade them from selecting the union as bargaining agent. 0
On the day before the election the president of the company had small groups
of employees brought to his office to hear a speech which construed the election
as a matter of loyalty to the company, and seemed to imply that disloyalty
would be followed by unpleasant consequences which the president might or
might not be able to avoid.?T
In deciding the case prior to the Taft-Hartley modifications, the Trial Ex-
aminer had concluded that the employer's oral and printed statements were in-
23. 77 N.L.R.B. No. 18 (April 16, 1948).
24. The Board did order the company to cease and desist from interrogating its em-
ployees as to their union membership. This conduct, however, vas not within the purview
of Section 8(c), nor was it relied upon in setting aside the election.
25. The letters outlined the advantage of working for the Corporation, which was
more interested than "any outsider" in its employees. Employees were advised "'to de-
termine whether [they] want to change the relationships that have existed in General Shoe
Corporation for so many years."
One leaflet read in part: "You know that men were brought back who had been
wounded to stand in front of unions and BEG them to do their share of the work.
"YOU KNOW men stayed overseas unnecessarily for many months just because un-
ions were on strike.
"YOU KNOW men were killed because materials and ammunition did not get to
them because of strikes."
Another argued the following five points: (1) Unions mean strikes and the em-
ployees and the Company lose money; (2) Unions make workers dissatisfied, and un-
happy workers are poor shoemakers; (3) Unions penalize the better employees by not
recognizing merit; (4) Unions cost money contributed by workers to promote jobs and
potential power for union leaders, and (5) Unions set employees and management at war
with each other and are thus bad for both.
A mimeographed letter accused the Union of attempting to poison the minds of the
workers, and asked them to "show the Southern Spirit of Independence and the will to
think for yourselves." Intermediate Report, p. 5-6, General Shoe Corporation, 77 N.L.R.B.
No. 18 (April 16, 1947).
26. On several occasions the foremen went further, advising employees that all unions
were "fit for was to cause strikes and trouble making" and to "go ahead and vote for it if
you wish" but they would "be sorry afterward." Said one employee: "[I was asked by a
foreman] if I would like to work beside of a nigger, and I told him I wouldn't and he -aid
if we got a union, that is what would happen." Id. at 4.
27. The Trial Examiner considered especially significant, in the light of the intemperate
speech as a whole, the employer's assertions that the government refused to allow un-
ions at the Oak Ridge atom bomb plant because "possibly the government kmew that un-
ion meant trouble and they couldn't afford to have it while they were producing the atom
bomb. Is there anything more important to you than your own job?" Id. at 10.
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tegral parts of a coercive anti-union campaign, and were therefore unfair
labor practices and sufficient grounds for setting aside the election.28 Further
than this, even if the speech itself was privileged under the Constitution, it
achieved a coercive effect when delivered to an audience which had lost the
freedom to determine whether they wanted to listen.29 The Trial Examiner
had held that since few of the employees visited in their homes by a super-
visor would have the temerity to refuse him admittance, they were as much
a "captive audience" as those employees ordered to the president's office dur-
ing working hours. "Suggestions" made in this atmosphere were calculated
to and did interfere with their untrammeled choice of bargaining representa-
tives.
The Board, after passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, felt constrained by Sec-
tion 8(c) to disregard the frame of reference which had guided the Trial
Examiner. In holding that the speech, standing alone, contained no overt
threat of reprisal or promise of benefit, the Board unanimously agreed that
the statements were not unfair practices. Nevertheless, a majority of the
Board vacated the election 80 Its rationale was that Section 8(c) applied only
to unfair labor practice cases and did not nullify "the Board's own adminis-
trative standards" of election integrity. Although the employer's activities
were "not held to constitute unfair labor practices within the meaning of the
amended Act, certain of them created an atmosphere calculated to prevent a
free untrammeled choice by the employees." The attempts to influence forced
listeners at the plant and in their homes went "far beyond the presently ac-
cepted custom of campaigns directed at employees' reasoning faculties. .. ."
28. He stated: "In the instant case viewed in the setting in which they were made,
respondent's utterances achieved a coercive effect. Respondent repeatedly disparaged the
character of the Union leaders, and their motives, indicated that a union victory would
disrupt the harmonious relationship existing between management and labor, said that the
advent of the Union would cause strikes and subsequent loss of earning to employees,
claimed that the Union could not obtain any benefits that the employees did not have, say-
ing that the Union could only "ask" ; and stated that the Union would only force employees
to pay dues and "unknown assessments" which it claimed was all, plus political power, the
Union really wanted. Respondent by repeatedly referring to strikes during the war and by
their statements about such strikes made apparent that it considered joining the Union to
be unpatriotic. Such a campaign occurring in a 'county seat in an agricultural community'
which had a population of only 5,000 or 6,000 and in which respondent controlled 600 to 650
jobs could not but exploit the dependence of the employees upon respondent for employ-
ment." Ibid.
29. The Examiner relied squarely upon Clark Brothers Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 802 (1946),
enforcement granted, 163 F. 2d 373 (2d Cir. 1947). The Clark decision, overruled sub
silentio in the General Shoe Corporation case, has been more overtly overruled, under the
mandate of Section 8(c), in Babcock & Wilcox Co., 77 N.L.R.B. No. 96 (May 13, 1948).
30. Two dissenting members vigorously maintained that until present "the Board has
consistently overruled objections to elections predicated upon the anti-union utterances of
an employer prior to an election where such expressions of opinion could not be found
violative of the Act ... [T]he Board cannot justify setting aside elections merely because
the employer avails himself of the protection which the statute specifically provides." Gen-
eral Shoe Corporation, 77 N.L.R.B. No. 18 (April 16, 1948).
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Under the new Act, the Board's refusal to find an unfair labor practice from
the general context of the speech seems required, if not by the wording of Sec-
tion 8(c), by the intent of its drafters.3 1 It is much less certain, however,
that Congress meant to prohibit the Board from finding implications of re-
prisal in the speech itself. Although the Senate's clear grant of such discre-
tion32 was not incorporated into the final measure, the more stringent House
provisionm was so qualified as to make it at least arguable that the Board had
retained power to control implied coercion. 34  Despite this, the Trial Exam-
iner's conclusion that the office speech itself carried thinly veiled threatsP5
was rejected, apparently by reason of the amendment. 0
The Board might have circumvented Section 8(c) by holding that affirna-
tive conduct other than speech was not protected.3 7  Thus, company instruc-
tions to supervisors, supervisors' visits to employees in their homes, the sum-
moning of employees to assemble in the president's office, all might have been
found to exceed the mere expression of "views, argument, or opinion" and
therefore be unfair labor practices. But merely shifting the stigma of illegality
from speech to other acts involved in the totality of employer conduct might
be considered a patent violation of Congressional intent.
31. The House bill, which provided that speech was not coercive unless "by its own
terms" it threatened reprisals, intended to exclude both the "totality of conduct" and
"captive audience" criteria. H. K. REP. No. 245, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. 33, 54 (1947). While
the Senate version would have permitted the Board to consider statements "under all the
circumstances" the final bill retained most of the House provision, only omitting the re-
quirement that coercion appear in the statement explicitly. SE-. RE'. No. 10S, 80th Cong,
1st Sess. 23-4, 35 (1947) ; H. R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 45 (1947). Some
commentators determined that Section 8(c) has not materially affected existing Board
practice. Cox, supra note 21, at 17; 2 P-H LAB. SEnv. Par. 20,501, 20,845, 21,447 (1947).
Another has questioned the constitutionality of the amendment in legislating away the
qualifications placed on free speech by the courts. Mulroy, supra note 21, at 612-13.
32. SEN. REP. No. 105, 0th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1947). It is difficult to see how the
Senate provision would have altered pre-existing practice. The minority members of the
Senate Committee on Education and Labor which reported the bill hailed it as "excellent."
Id., Part 2 at 41. Contrast this with their attacks upon Section 8(c) in its final form. 93
CONG. REc. 6446, 6496, 6503 (1947).
33. See note 31 supra.
34. This argument appears more valid in the light of ambiguous Senate debate on the
final measure. Senator Taft assured his colleagues that certain fact situations under Sec-
tion 8(c) "involve a consideration of the surrounding circumstances." 93 Co-.o. R c. 6446
(1947). Also confusing is his statement: "We accepted the House provision which was
perhaps a little stronger than the Senate provisions, but not substantially different in
principle." Id. at 6445.
35. See note 28 supra.
36. The implied conclusion here that the Board may no longer expose disguised threats
is borne out by the decision in Wrought Iron Range Company, 77 N.L.R.B. No. 85 (May
7, 1948) (by implication). This case is amply considered in 22 LAB. Rxi. Reu. (Analysis)
9 (1948).
37. The Board had drawn this distinction in Ames Spot Welder Co., Inc., 75 N.LR.B.
352 (1947), holding the questioning of an employee about his union membership not
an expression of opinion within the meaning of the new section. Senator Taft himself had
emphasized this limitation of Section 8(c). 93 CNG. REc. 6S60 (1947).
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In refusing to extend the amendment's protection to election cases the
Board chose a novel and perhaps contradictory avoidance of legislative pur-
pose. While it seems to have been the spirit of Section 8(c) that speech
which did not constitute an unfair labor practice should not be restricted in
any way,38 Congress apparently neglected to consider criteria for free elections
on the assumption that these tests would continue to correspond to criteria for
unfair practices. In creating the dichotomy between unfair labor practice
and representation cases, the Board appears to be in the inconsistent position
of construing legally non-coercive expression of opinion as creative of an
illegally coercive atmosphere.30 Actually, however, the Board has asserted
that conduct, heretofore an unfair labor practice, may still interfere with the
free choice of bargaining representatives, although such conduct no longer
violates the act.
The decision, while salvaging Board discretion in representation cases, is
nevertheless a dubious guarantee that elections will be free. Since the Board
may not order the cessation of conduct except in the realm of unfair labor
practices,40 an employer may continue to harangue employees in his office or
38. See SEN. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23-4 (1947); H. R. RsP. No. 510,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1947) ; 93 CoNG. REc. A1909-10 (1947). Senator Ball has sug-
gested that the N.L.R.B.'s "refusal to apply the free-speech amendment to representation
cases," inter alia, may "indicate a trend which makes it advisable to transform enforce-
ment" of the Act to the federal courts directly or to new labor courts. Hearings before
Joint Committee on Labor Management Relations on the Operation of the Labor-Manage-
ment Relations Act, 1947, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1948). The Committee's report has not
yet been published.
39. But no constitutional objections to the Board's position may be raised, since the
practice of examining employer speech in its total context has been declared an allowable
qualification upon free speech under the Constitution. See note 5 supra. The safeguards of
Section 8(c) exceed decisional safe-conduct, and in disregarding these additional protec-
tions the Board raises only questions of statutory interpretation.
40. 49 STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1946), as amended, 61 STAT. 146 (1947),
(§ 10) 29 U.S.C.A. § 160 (Supp. 1947). The employer too is in a difficult tactical posi-
tion, since cease and desist orders are the only ones which the circuit courts may review.
National Labor Relations Board v. Falk Corporation, 308 U. S. 453 (1940); American
Federation of Labor v. National Labor Relations Board, 308 U. S. 401 (1940); J. L.
Brandeis & Sons v. National Labor Relations Board, 142 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1944); Note,
Judicial Review of Representation Cases Under the National Labor Relations Act, 28
GEo. L. J. 666 (1940). The Administrative Procedure Act has not altered this rule. Ohio
Power Co. v. N.L.R.B., 164 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1947), noted. 32 Mimi. L. Rav. 807 (1948).
The General Shoe Corporation, which maintains that the Board has acted ultra vires and
in derogation of the First Amendment, apparently has no direct way of testing its conten-
tion in the circuit court. It may, however, seek indirect judicial review of the election
case. Where the union wins in a new election, the Corporation might refuse to bargain
collectively, and an unfair labor practice proceeding would follow. Should the Corporation
then refuse to obey a cease and desist order, it might collaterally attack the Board ruling
setting aside the original election in an enforcement suit brought before the circuit court.
The Board is now contemplating an enforcement proceeding in respect to the cease and
desist order, note 24, supra. The Corporation has indicated that, in any court action, it will
seek to have the Board's order in the representation case set aside. Letter to Mr. Paul
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send supervisors to propagandize them in their homes. Should these activi-
ties cause union defeat in an election which the Board subsequently determines
was not a free one, the employer's sole penalty is the inconvenience of sub-
mitting to another election:" The disfavored union still is denied status as
bargaining representative.4 2
Furthermore, the union's right to secure a new election before the normal
waiting period has elapsed now appears of nominal value, for the Board will
direct a new election only when the Regional Director is advised that the "cir-
cumstances permit a free choice of representatives."4 2  Since the employer
may not be enjoined from continuing in his course of anti-union conduct the
Board would be unable to maintain the appropriate "circumstances" and a new
election might well be postponed indefinitely. Even should the Board order
another balloting, there is no bar to a repetition of misconduct sufficient to
vitiate the results. 0
Ineffectual as the General Shoe Corporation decision may be, the Board's un-
willingness to disregard the coercive color which surrounding circumstances
may cast upon apparently innocuous speech is to be welcomed. This retention
of a broad range of criteria may be opposed on the ground that unions have
gained in strength since the early days of the Wagner Act, and no longer re-
quire such infant protection.- It should be pointed out, however, that the
Wagner Act was designed not to shelter unions but to guarantee employees the
free choice of bargaining representatives. Furthermore, overall union strength
is no counter-balance in non-union plants and in regions which are economically
backward and where labor is largely unorganized.4A
If a realistic evaluation of employer speech involves all the elements which
Stykes, Regional Director of the NLRB, from Bass, Berry & Sims, attorneys for rcsp~nd-
ent.
41. Following the Taft-Hartley Act had thp union lost in a valid election, a new elec-
tion could not be held within the following twelve months. 61 STA. 143 (1947)
(§9(c) (3), 29 U.S.C.A. § 159(c) (3) (Supp. 1947). Where an ejection is set aside, how;-
ever, a new one may be ordered whenever the Regional Director determines that conditions
permit free choice. But this may be no more than a paper gain.
42. In almost all cases the employer's campaign is directed against an outside union,
which is attempting either to organize the plant or to unseat the incumbent bargaining
representative. In rare instances where the "inside union" is subjected to the coercive
campaign, its defeat in an election which is vacated will not alter its bargaining position.
43. General Shoe Corporation, 77 N.L.R.B. No. 18 (April 16, 194S). This is the
standard Board order in decisions setting aside an election.
44. Cases tracing the evolution of a more liberal outlcok on employer speech, and
resting to a large degree upon the growing strength of the labor movement, are collected
in 2 TLI., op. cit. supra note 4, § 252.
45. That these areas are potential centers of employer coercion is currently illustrated
by the number of unfair labor practice and representation cases arising in the southern
states. While the number of unfair labor practice cases during the fiscal year 1947 declined
8% from 1946 in the New England states, the number rose 24% in the South Atlantic
states, and by 31.8%o in the East South Central states. 12 NLRB Amu. REP. 63-9 (1943).
Although these statistics do not show the number of "coercion" cases, there is no reason
not to assume that these have risen proportionately. Representation cases, an accurate in-
1948]
